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Farm Return and Land Price Effects
from Environmental Standards and
Stocking Density Restrictions
Alfons Weersink, Greg deVos, and Peter Stonehouse
This study assesses the economic and environmental effects to hog finishing farms from residual
taxes/standards and restrictions on manure application and stocking density. Economic effects are
measured in terms of net farm income and land prices, while levels of ammonia and excess nitrogen
and phosphorus proxy the environmental effects. Any environmental policy requiring the need for
additional land comes at a small cost to farmers who have access to adequate neighboring land. If this
is not the case, then manure application and stocking density restrictions are expensive since the
producer is basically forced to either purchase land or reduce hog production levels.
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Public concerns over the environmental consequen-
ces of livestock production and the concentration of
that production in larger farm units has led to more
numerous, and increasingly more stringent, regu-
lations on farm practices. These regulations have
evolved from simple ex ante restrictions, such as
minimum separation distances of new barns from
waterways, to ex post controls or incentives on man-
agement practices. Although there is a geographical
disparity in the extent of the legislation among
countries and jurisdictions (Beghin and Metcalfe,
2000), nutrient management standards and/or stock-
ing density restrictions are becoming part of the
regulatory constraints facing livestock farmers.
For example, confined animal feeding operations
(CAFOs) in the United States will not be able to
spread manure at a rate greater than the crop nutrient
demands. Similarly, many Canadian livestock
farmers will be required to have in place a nutrient
management plan (NMP) that includes a verification
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of stocking density to ensure nutrient standards are
not exceeded, as well as an indication of how nutri-
ents are to be monitored and applied.
The restrictions will come at a cost to farmers, as
several studies have concluded that the disposal
expenses of manure outweigh its nutrient value as
a replacement for purchased fertilizers (Boland et
al., 1999; Boland, Preckel, and Foster, 1998; Roka
and Hoag, 1996). For example, Schnitkey and Mir-
anda (1993) found that restrictions of phosphorus
application reduce hog numbers by approximately
the same percentage as the reduction in required
phosphate runoff. Den Ouden (1997) estimated the
direct cost of regulation in the Netherlands to be
between 5% and 10% of the average total cost of
hog production, and similar estimates of approxi-
mately $2S$5 per hog cost increases associated with
nitrogen application standards were obtained by
Lauwers, van Huylenbroeck, and Martens (1998).
Fleming and Long (2002) estimated average net
farm revenue would fall by 7% if manure can only
be applied on land with slopes of less than 12%.
The impacts of land availability prominent in pro-
posed environmental legislations were not addressed
by these studies.
Recent papers by Kaplan, Johansson, and Peters
(2004), and Johansson and Kaplan (2004) examine
the implications of land constraints of manure appli-
cation at the regional and sector levels in the United
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States, while Vukina and Wossink (2000) estimated
the increase in Dutch land prices in regions where a
manure quota restriction was binding. These studies
show the price effects of land constraints and the
regional variation in impacts, but do not examine
how individual operators would respond to applica-
tion restrictions under alternative conditions. Using
survey data on land availability, manure levels, and
application rates for U.S. swine farms, Ribuado,
Gollehon, and Agapoff (2003) found that most hog
farmers apply their livestock waste at levels greater
than the needs of a nitrogen-based (N-based) or
phosphorus-based (P-based) nutrient management
plan. Meeting the requirements of a nutrient standard
would require large farms to find significant amounts
of land (particularly for a P-based standard), but the
costs of acquiring such land were not addressed by
Ribuado, Gollehon, and Agapoff (2003).
Previous studies have not provided a compre-
hensive assessment of the changes in all major
residuals from hog farms [ammonia and excess
nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus)] and farm
abatement costs prompted by the major types of
manure legislation. This study develops a theoreti-
cal and empirical model to examine the farm-level
effects on returns, land values, and residuals from
pending application and stocking density restrictions.
While farmers can change rations and handling
systems in response to policy efforts, it will be
demonstrated in this analysis that the financial
impacts depend significantly on the availability of
land for manure disposal.
The objective of this study is to assess the eco-
nomic and environmental effects to hog finishing
farms from residual taxes/standards and restrictions
on manure application and stocking density. In the
following section, a theoretical model is presented
which determines the shadow values of manure and
land along with the effects of environmental poli-
cies on those values. We then outline the optimiza-
tion model used to determine the producer choice of
management system with each policy and the
associated residual levels. The model is based on a
hypothetical hog finishing farm in the livestock-
intensive region of southwestern Ontario where the
geographic conditions are similar to states in the
U.S. Great Lakes region. In the next section, the
effects of taxes/standards on ammonia, excess
nitrogen, and excess phosphorus, together with
restrictions on manure and stocking density, are
evaluated in terms of net farm returns, residuals,
and land prices. The paper concludes with a discus-
sion of the policy implications.
The Theoretical Model
The Base Model
To illustrate the effects of manure legislation, we
will assume a static model for a representative hog
finishing operation that produces hogs (H).
1 These
pigs can be sold at a net price of ph, representing
the difference between the selling price of hogs and
the purchase price of feeder pigs. The farmer also
raises a crop which is sold and then bought back for
feed for a net selling price of pc. The yield of the
crop is a function of the nutrients applied (n), Y(n).
Nutrients are provided from either inorganic sources
of commercial fertilizer (f) purchased at price pf, or
from manure (m), so that n = m + f. Crop-available
nutrients in the manure (m) are a linear function of
the application rate of manure (a) and a factor con-
verting manure volume to the amount of fertilizer
that can be used by the crop (nl), m = nla. The
amount of manure produced on the farm (M) is the
product of hog output and the volume of manure
produced per pig, α (M = αH). The cost of raising
pigs, including manure handling, is given by the
function C(αH), which is assumed to increase at an
increasing rate. The per hectare cost of manure
application, pa, is constant regardless of the appli-
cation rate (a) and the number of hectares on which
manure is applied (L). The farmer must apply the
total volume produced by the hogs (M) on available
cropland (M = aL). Land can be obtained at a rental
rate of r per hectare, but only Lmax is available.
The producer is assumed to maximize net returns
from livestock and crop production through the
choice of hog numbers, manure and commercial
fertilizer application rates, and land area subject to
the constraints of manure disposal and available land.
The problem can be formally stated through the
following Lagrangean equation (ζ) obtained after
substitution for the various identities:
(1)  ζ(H, a, f, L) ' Max phH % pcY(nla % f )L
& C(αH) & paaL & pf fL& rL
% µ(αH & aL) % λ(Lmax& L).
The respective Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions
for the choice variables (H, a, f, L) are:
(2)  ph & CH % µα H ' 0,
1  Innes (2000) has developed a spatial, theoretical model to explore the
efficiency effects of scale regulations, taxes, and handling standards with
three environmental effects (spills, runoff, and direct ambient pollution).274   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
(3)   ( pcnlYn& pa& µ)L a ' 0,
µ αH & aL ' 0,
(4)   ( pcYn& pf )L f ' 0,
(5)   pcY & paa & pf f & r & µa & λ L ' 0,
λ Lmax& L ' 0,
where µ is the shadow value of manure and λ is the
marginal value of an additional hectare.
Optimal hog production is found through (H()
equation (2), where marginal revenue (ph) less
marginal cost (CH) is equal to the shadow price of
manure on a per hog basis. Assuming an interior
solution the manure shadow price is given (H(>0 ) ,
by:
(6)   µ '&(ph& CH)/α.
Note, µ is negative and represents the implicit cost
of disposing of manure. It increases in absolute
terms with hog price and with decreases in the
amount of manure produced by an individual pig.
The optimal application rate of manure is found
by solving equation (3) explicitly for a. At this rate,
the marginal benefit of increased crop yield less
application cost is equal to the shadow value of
manure. Since µ is negative, it is possible for a
profit-maximizing farmer to apply manure at a rate
such that its marginal product is negative (Yn < 0) if
the cost of disposal is too great. Whether a farmer
uses commercial fertilizer and/or manure for crop
nutrient needs depends on comparing the net mar-
ginal value of the two inputs. Assuming pa !µ is
less than pf, it is possible for the marginal value of
commercial fertilizer to be greater than its marginal
input cost and still not be used (f = 0). Schnitkey
and Miranda (1993) develop a model where the
choice between manure and commercial fertilizer
application in a given field depends on the distance
of that field from the livestock facility. However, in
this model, the application rate associated with
optimal hog production will be equal to αH
*/L, so
that some manure will be applied on all land with
any deficit nutrient needs covered by inorganic
fertilizer.
Land will be rented until the marginal benefits of
growing crops (pcY) and disposing of the manure
(!µa) are equal to the per hectare costs of organic
and/or commercial fertilizer application and the mar-
ket rental rate [equation (5)]. The marginal value of
an additional unit of land is given by:
(7)   λ ' pcY & paa & pf f & r & µa .
Thus, the shadow value of land increases with an
increase in the implicit cost of manure disposal
(increases with the marginal returns to hog produc-
tion) and increases in net crop returns per land unit.
Manure Application Restrictions
Residuals into the environment from livestock-crop
production are assumed to be associated with the
application of nutrients beyond the requirements of
the crop. In an effort to reduce excess nutrient
loadings, many regions have implemented maximum
application rates on either the volume of manure or
the amount of a given nutrient that can be applied.
Assuming the producer in the above model faces a
constraint on the amount of manure that can be
applied per hectare (amax), the first-order conditions
are modified to:
(3N)   ( pcnlYn& pa& µ)L & n a ' 0,
n(amax& a) ' 0,
where n is the marginal cost to the producer of the
application restriction. Assuming the application
constraint is binding so that the restriction is less
than the profit-maximizing rate in the original prob-
lem n is positive. If all available land is (a(> amax),
rented, the restriction implies the number of hogs
must be reduced from the previous scenario in
order to meet the constraint on manure volume
equaling the amount spread.
The effect of the reduced application rate on the
marginal value of land can be seen by evaluating
equation (7) under The difference de- a( and amax.
pends on the shadow value of manure. The restric-
tion forces a reduction in optimal hog numbers (if
there is not enough available land to spread the
volume of manure generated), and thereby increases
the net marginal return to raising hogs. Thus, the
shadow value of land is directly related to the
implicit cost of manure disposal. Note the determin-
istic nature of the model implies a tax rate on manure
application of n associated with will result in the a(
desired reduction in application rate.
Stocking Density Restrictions
Another increasingly common restriction imposed
on hog farmers is that there is a fixed amount of land
available for each animal unit produced. Imposing
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SDmax on the base model, the first-order conditions
are modified to:
(2N)  ph& CH % µα & δ/L H ' 0,
δ(SDmax& H/L) ' 0,
(5N)  pcY& paa& pf f&r&µa%δ(H/L2)&λ L'0,
λ L(& L ' 0,
where δ is the marginal cost of the stocking density
restriction. The marginal value of land with the
restriction increases to:
(7N)  λ ' pcY & paa & pf f & r & µa % δ(H/L2) .
The increase in the shadow value of an additional
hectare of land associated with the restriction will
increase with hog numbers and decrease with the
amount of land available.
The Empirical Model
The extent of the impacts of the alternative environ-
mental policy instruments suggested by the theoret-
ical model is evaluated on a typical hog finishing
operation using an optimization model developed
by Stonehouse, deVos, and Weersink (2002). The
model is based on conditions for a swine farmer in
the livestock-intensive region of southwestern
Ontario that is similar to the physical environment
in Great Lake states such as Michigan and Ohio.
The number of pigs on farms in Ontario has risen
steadily over time to its current level of 3.7 million,
with much of the total exported. Cash sales from
pig farms represent approximately 10% of total farm
receipts for the province.
The empirical model incorporates several com-
plexities not included in the theoretical model of the
previous section. First, several residuals with
significant environmental impacts are considered:
ammonia, excess nitrogen, and excess phosphorus.
The former is associated with climate change and
odor, while the latter two residuals contribute pri-
marily to water quality deterioration in the form of
eutrophication and hypoxia. Second, the level of
these residuals can be altered by the choice of prac-
tices such as feeding ration, manure storage, and
application method. In addition, there are potential
tradeoffs among the level of residuals between
systems since those that reduce ammonia through
volatilization will increase the level of nitrogen (N)
in the manure, and thus potential excess N. Trade-
offs between N and P are discussed in Leneman,
Giesen, and Berentsen (1993).
The objective of the model is to maximize farm
returns net of the costs and values of handling and
utilizing the manure produced through the choice of
manure management system, hog production levels,
fertilizer purchases, land rentals, crop production
and sales, and feed purchases. Mathematically, the
objective function is specified as:
















pen,kENk& plL % j
j
pc,jYj,
where ph is the net price per hog produced (H), M
is the volume of manure with a potential price (or
cost) of pm, pms,i is the annualized cost of manure
handling system (MS) i, Aj is the area allocated to
crop j ( j = corn and soybeans), cj is the cost per hec-
tare of growing crop j, pf,k is the price of inorganic
fertilizer of nutrient k ( k = nitrogen and phos-
phorus), Fj,k is the amount of nutrient k purchased
for use on crop j, MNk is the amount of nutrient k
available from manure with a potential price of
pmn, NH is the amount of ammonia lost with a price
of pNH, ENk is the amount of nutrient k above crop
needs lost to the environment at a price of pen, L is
the amount of neighboring land available to apply
manure at a cost of pl, and Yj is the output of crop j
sold at a price of pc,j.
Choice variables include the number of hogs fin-
ished and the manure handling system. There are 81
possible systems (MS) based on a combination of
each of three possible alternatives for feeding,
collection, storage, and application. Feed ration
choices include a base corn-soybean meal ration, a
second that adds lysine, which can replace some of
the crude protein in the ration and subsequently
reduce the level of nitrogen in the manure, and a
third that adds phytase. Phytase reduces phosphorus
residuals in hog manure by enabling the hogs to
better utilize P in grain, thereby reducing the need
to add di-calcium phosphate to feed. Low-phytic
acid corn may also serve to reduce excess P levels,
but was not considered in the model.
The three collection methods for the liquid ma-
nure are (a) by gravity through fully-slatted floors,
(b) through partially-slatted floors to below-floor
temporary storage (flush gutter), or (c) by scraping276   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
of solid concrete floors to storage. The three storage
choices are (a) an earthen pit (lagoon), (b) an
above-ground, open-topped concrete tank, or (c) an
above-ground, covered concrete tank. The field
application of manure is either by (a) an irrigation
gun, (b) a tanker broadcaster, or (c) a tanker injector.
These activities are included in the optimization
model as integer variables.
The remaining choice variables in the model are
specified as real number activities. In addition to
hog numbers, the farmer must choose what crops to
grow and whether the nutrient needs for these crops
are provided from the manure and/or synthetic ferti-
lizers. Tillable land can be used to grow corn and/or
soybeans, each of which can be sold at market prices.
While corn can be retained for feeding, soybeans
must first be sold and then purchased back as soy-
bean oil meal. Any necessary supplemental feed
purchases such as soy meal are at market prices.
Constraints on the model include a limit on the
number of hogs produced (H # Hmax). The repre-
sentative farm is assumed to finish 1,000 hogs per
100-day hog finishing cycle (Hmax = 3,000 annually).
Total manure produced per annum is a function of
hog production and volume of manure produced
per hog, α (αH = M). The nutrient composition of
manure is a function of the feed ration, as well as
starting and finishing weights of the pig. The level
of nutrients in the manure depends on the excretion
rates of nutrients and the losses associated with
each manure system. For example, gaseous nitrogen
losses in the form of NH4 from volatilization will be
higher with an earthen pit than other storage systems
and result in lower N levels in the manure to be
applied. The constraints on nutrient availability in




where nk,i is the amount of nutrient k in a crop-
available form in manure associated with system i.
The levels of manure produced, its nutrients compo-
sition and availability, and volatilization rates are
estimated for alternative systems using MCLONE4,
which is a computerized decision support tool for
manure management in Ontario conditions (Manure
Systems Research Group, 1999).
The manure residuals estimated for each system
are gaseous ammonia, along with excess nitrogen
and phosphorus applied to cropland. Volatilization




where nhl,i is the amount of ammonia emitted with
manure system i. Crop nutrient balancing restrictions
ensure that crop needs are met through manure
application or from inorganic fertilizer purchases,
and also allow the quantities of excess nutrients to
be measured. Nutrient transfer restrictions can be
summarized by:
(9)  &MNk% j
j
fk,jAj& fkL % Fk& ENk ' 0,
where fk,j is the optimal application rate of nutrient
k to crop j, and fk is the application rate of the nutri-
ent to additional land requirements. In some situ-
ations, there is no additional land available and all
manure must be applied on the given land base.
When nutrient needs of the crop are not met
through manure application, supplementary inorganic
fertilizer can be purchased at market cost.
Manure application rates are assumed to be set
so as not to exceed a maximum loading rate, which
will depend on crop grown (10m
3 per hectare for
soybeans and 20m
3 per hectare for corn) as speci-
fied in provincial guidelines (Ontario Ministry of
Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs, 1999). The
amount of land for manure disposal—which is
confined to the spring, and feed crop production
purposes—is assumed to be 40 hectares. This land
area is typical for a hog farmer finishing 3,000 hogs
annually, and also allows for all manure to be dis-
posed at the assumed loading rates. When the model
makes neighboring land available, it can only be
used for manure disposal at a fixed cost. The model
was constructed in Microsoft Excel, and further
details on the structure and parameter values are
found in Stonehouse, deVos, and Weersink (2002).
Results
Base Systems
The profit-maximizing model involved a manure
management system of a corn-soybean meal ration
with lysine, solid flooring, an earthen pit storage,
and irrigation application. Net farm returns to labor,
management, and land are $123,596 (Can.), and the
residual levels for ammonia and excess nutrients
are reported in tables 1 and 2. The second-order
conditions are satisfied, as each of the 81 potential
farm management systems were evaluated indi-
vidually. The resulting unique optimal system
involves operating at full hog production capacity,
planting all available land to corn, disposing of all
hog manure solely on this ground, selling all corn,Weersink, deVos, and Stonehouse Environmental Standards and Stocking Density Restrictions   277
Table 1. Effects of Ammonia Taxes/Restrictions on Farm Returns and Ammonia Levels for Two
Hog Farming Systems
Ammonia Tax ($/kg)
System         Measure 0  20  30  40
Most Profitable
 a Net Farm Returns (Can$) 123,596 22,080 17,937 17,937
Ammonia Lost (kg) 5,143 3,403 0 0
Herd Reduction (%) 0 34 100 100
Typical
 b Net Farm Returns (Can$) 116,218 48,618 15,193 10,559
Ammonia Lost (kg) 3,380 3,380 2,236 0
Herd Reduction (%) 0 0 34 100
a Most profitable manure management system involves corn-soybean meal ration with lysine, solid flooring, earthen pit storage, and
irrigation application. Manure can be disposed on 40-hectare land base which grows all corn for sale and purchases all hog feed.
b Typical system is same as most profitable system above, except fully-slatted floors and concrete sealed storage.
Table 2. Effects of Excess Nutrients Taxes (Manure Application Restrictions) on Residual Levels
and Farm Production for Two Hog Farming Systems
Rental 
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a Most profitable manure management system involves corn-soybean meal ration with lysine, solid flooring, earthen pit storage, and
irrigation application. Manure can be disposed on 40-hectare land base which grows all corn for sale and purchases all hog feed.
b Typical system is same as most profitable system above, except fully-slatted floors and concrete sealed storage.
and purchasing all hog feed requirements separately
from suppliers. The farmer’s shadow price on an
additional hectare of land is $761.79 with this
system. Using a discount rate of 10%, the corres-
ponding bid price for land is $7,617.90 per hectare
($3,047.16 per acre), which is around the average
price for farmland in the livestock-intensive region
of southwestern Ontario during the year 2000 time
period on which the parameter values were
originally based. This is an indicator that the
parameters assumed, including the land base chosen
for the hypothetical hog farm in this study, are
appropriate.
Alternative manure management systems have
differing levels of farm returns and residuals. Conse-
quently, the effects of environmental legislation on
profitability and residuals will vary depending upon
the system the farmer presently has in place. Thus,
in addition to the profit-maximizing system, a typi-
cal hog finishing operation is also examined. This
system involves the same feed ration and appli-
cation method but with fully-slatted floors and a
covered, concrete storage. Farm returns are 6% less
($116,218 vs. $123,596), but emission levels vary
depending on the residual. Ammonia levels are
more than 50% greater, while excess N levels are278   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
approximately 30% less for the profit-maximizing
system than the typical one (see tables 1 and 2).
Excess P levels are the same for both systems. The
tradeoffs between income and residual levels for
these two manure handling systems, together with
others, are fully discussed in deVos, Weersink, and
Stonehouse (2003), as is the sensitivity of the opti-
mal farm management practices to prices. Inferences
on the effects of manure legislation for alternative
farming systems are drawn from the relative effects
on these two farm types.
Residual Restrictions
The effects of manure application restrictions are
considered in terms of restrictions on the levels of
excess residuals, which are assumed to be determin-
istically related to application levels. The deter-
ministic assumption also implies that the restrictions
can be viewed either through a direct standard or
through a residual tax.
Reducing the amount of nitrogen lost to the
atmosphere can be accomplished easiest by moving
to an application system that injects the manure
directly into the soil as opposed to spreading the
manure by an irrigation gun. The cost and ammonia
levels for the three application methods considered
are negatively correlated. The difference in costs
between irrigation and broadcast is approximately
$0.05 per hog, and between broadcast and injection
is $0.15 per hog. Since 1 kg is the average amount
of ammonia produced per hog marketed annually
across all handling systems, a small ammonia tax
will cause a shift between application systems.
Moving from irrigation to injection reduces total
ammonia levels by approximately 300 kg (10% of
total) for a farm marketing 3,000 hogs annually, de-
pending upon the handling system. Further ammonia
reductions must generally come by reducing the
total quantity of manure produced and not the appli-
cation rate. This result has significant effects on
profit, as shown by the large decreases in net farm
returns compared to the base scenarios for the two
farming systems with an irrigation-based applica-
tion method (table 2).
As smaller quantities of ammonia are emitted
from a manure system initially, higher effective tax
rates are required in order to provide the incentive
to reduce these residuals. For example, a tax of
$32.29 per kg of ammonia emitted would be required
to reduce ammonia residuals to zero by a farmer op-
erating under a typical manure management system.
In contrast, a tax of $21.16 per kg of ammonia
emitted is necessary to impose the same reduction
on a farmer operating under the system maximizing
farm returns. If less ammonia is emitted initially, a
farmer will value these units more at the margin and
will require a higher tax level to provide the neces-
sary incentive to cut back hog production.
Farmers with systems generating less ammonia
may not reduce herd levels with an ammonia tax.
For example, if a per unit ammonia residual tax of
$20 per kg was charged, the most profitable system
would cut annual hog production by approximately
34% at a cost of over $100,000. Total ammonia
levels emitted by this system would consequently
fall to 3,403 kg annually, which is still higher than
the base scenario under the typical management
system (3,380 kg) (table 1). With an ammonia tax
of $20 per kg, production levels, and thus ammonia
levels, would not change under this common
system, but net returns would be reduced by the
amount of tax paid (20 × 3,380).
The effects of regulations targeted to excess
nutrients (i.e., manure application restrictions) are
shown in table 2 for the two systems. The base
scenario is initially given for each, followed by the
excess N tax to reduce its residual level to zero,
followed by the excess P tax to do the same, and then
the excess P tax rate to lower excess P residuals to
zero. These rates (or restrictions) are determined
assuming excess land can be obtained and when no
land is available for manure disposal so that the re-
ductions in residuals come through herd reductions.
As discussed earlier, the availability of neigh-
boring land to apply manure is critical to the effects
of the residual taxes on excess nutrients. For ex-
ample, a tax of $0.10 per kg of excess N is required
to reduce applied nitrogen excesses to zero. At this
rate or higher, the farmer bears the transportation
cost associated with applying the total volume of
manure associated with 3,000 hogs over a larger
land base rather than pay the residual tax. An addi-
tional 12.3 hectares of land is sufficient to reduce
excess N to zero at a cost of $108 (0.1% of total net
farm returns). Note that the tax of $0.10 per kg of
excess N has the same effect if the manure applica-
tion rate was based on an N standard. Applying the
manure over this larger land base reduces excess P
levels to 476 kg, which can also be prompted with
an excess P tax of $0.19 per kg. A tax of $1.62 per
kg of excess P results in no excess nutrients as the
farmer obtains 23 more hectares on which to apply
the manure (table 2).
Eliminating excess nitrogen can still lead to
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to apply the same quantity of manure to meet a
standard on excess P (or avoid paying a tax on
excess P) than with an application standard tied to
excess N is consistent with several other studies
(e.g., Kaplan, Johannson, and Peters, 2004; Ribaudo,
Gollehon, and Agapoff, 2003). Although additional
distance costs to spread manure are not incorpor-
ated into this study (as done by Fleming, Babcock,
and Wang, 1998), delivery costs will be higher with
an excess P standard. Neither is the amount of phos-
phorus present in the soil from previous applications
considered, so that the effects of the restrictions
may be understated.
If no additional land is available to dispose of the
manure, the farmer must meet the nutrient standards
by decreasing hog production. A tax of $16.64 per
kg of excess N is sufficient to cause the farm to
reduce herd numbers by 18%, and consequently
reduce excess N levels to zero. A tax of approx-
imately $34 per kg of excess P is required to
eliminate excess P. This tax forces a 34% reduction
in herd numbers and an approximately 30%
reduction in net farm returns (table 2). The effects
of the application restrictions are similar across
the two systems. Note that gun irrigation is used
to apply the manure under both systems considered.
It is the cheapest of the three application methods
and maximizes the amount of N lost to the
atmosphere, and thus minimizes the amount of N in
the manure.
Manure and Stocking Density Restrictions
Two forms of output controls are considered:
manure/herd reductions of 25% and stocking
density restrictions (see table 3). Since the manure
systems assessed in this study do not alter the
volume of manure (only its composition), the
enforcement of manure volume restrictions is
equivalent to setting limits on hog numbers. Thus,
reducing herd numbers by 25% reduces the amount
of ammonia produced by the same percentage for
both systems. The profit-maximizing system there-
fore still remains as the system generating signif-
icantly more ammonia than the typical system listed
in table 3. The 25% reduction in manure/herd
reduces net returns by 21% for the typical system
compared to 20% for the most profitable system
that generates more ammonia. A blanket-type
approach is therefore relatively more costly to
farmers with less-polluting systems since they
receive no preferential treatment for initially using
better ammonia-containing management practices.
The reduction in herd numbers is sufficient to
eliminate excess N, but 267 kg of excess P remains
present with both systems.
The stocking density restriction constrains pro-
duction capacity to a maximum based on the
available land base. In Ontario, the most common
requirement is that enough land be available to
apply manure at rates of a maximum of one animal
unit per acre annually. One animal unit is equiv-
alent to 15 marketed finishing hogs. Thus, the
restriction of 37.5 hogs per hectare requires farmers
to have 40 hectares of neighboring land in addition
to their own in order to achieve their full hog
production capacity. Such a policy will effectively
reduce excess nutrient levels under both systems,
while the amount of ammonia is not changed since
the volume of manure remains constant. Shadow
prices on additional units of land decrease only
marginally to $558.09 per hectare with the decrease
associated with the small assumed transport costs of
manure to neighboring land.
The abatement costs would rise significantly if
no extra land was available to the producer to meet
the stocking density restriction of one animal unit
per acre. Production levels would have to be cut by
50% in both systems, thereby reducing net returns
by over 40% in each case. Applying less manure to
the existing land base of 40 hectares would elim-
inate both excess N and P, while ammonia levels
would fall by the same percentage as herd numbers
(50%). Once land becomes a constraining resource
on the amount of hogs that can be produced, its
shadow price skyrockets to $4,301.10 per hectare
($1,720.44 per acre) for own land, and to $3,516.88
per hectare ($1,406.75 per acre) for neighboring
land. The latter is the rental rate our hypothetical
hog farmer would be willing to pay for the use of
extra land that would be used only for manure
disposal purposes. In the livestock-intensive regions
of Ontario where stocking density restrictions were
imposed by local authorities, farmland values have
risen to approximately these values in the last three
years. For example, land in parts of Huron and
Perth counties has more than doubled to approx-
imately $7,000 per acre, which is consistent with
the values suggested in this study where stocking
density restrictions are binding. Thus, when land is
a limiting factor to production, marginal values
placed on an extra unit can increase significantly. In
addition, the attractiveness of entering one farm
industry (hogs) can strongly impact other farm
sectors through the bidding up of the price of
farmland.280   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Effects of Manure and Stocking Density Restrictions to Reduce Excess Nutrients on


















 a Manure (Herd) 3,857 0 267.1      98.9   0 25
Reduction of 25% 5,143 0 0    119.7 40   0
Stocking Density 2,572 0 0      72.3   0 50
Typical
 b Manure (Herd) 2,535 0 267.1      91.8   0 25
Reduction of 25% 3,380 0 0    112.5 40   0
Stocking Density 1,690 0 0      65.1   0 50
a Most profitable manure management system involves corn-soybean meal ration with lysine, solid flooring, earthen pit storage, and
irrigation application. Manure can be disposed on 40-hectare land base which grows all corn for sale and purchases all hog feed.
b Typical system is same as most profitable system above, except fully-slatted floors and concrete sealed storage.
Conclusions
This study has developed a simple theoretical model
to illustrate the effects of environmental policies on
the shadow values of manure disposal and land. It
then empirically estimated the effects of these
policies on farm returns and the levels of ammonia,
excess nitrogen, and excess phosphorus. Residual
standards/taxes that recognize the heterogeneity
among producers can reduce residual levels at
relatively low costs to producers. Those farmers
emitting low levels of residuals may not need to
adjust practices to meet the standards, while those
generating higher levels will have to adjust their
manure handling. However, the standards on
ammonia and excessive nitrogen cannot be met by
a single system without reductions in hog numbers
or increases in available land. Systems that reduce
volatilization will subsequently increase the nitro-
gen content of manure, and thereby increase the
likelihood of nitrogen levels from manure being
above crop requirements. The industry-prescribed
excess application limit of phosphate to land is high
enough that it will not affect any manure manage-
ment systems under farm conditions assumed for
this study. This limit will only be breached in the
most excessive soil phosphorus level conditions.
Farmer-owned land base and quantities of avail-
able neighboring land are the major factors influ-
encing the effects of environmental policies on hog
farms. These variables determine the hog stocking
density of the operation, the total nutrient excesses
applied to land, and the marginal value a farmer
will place on additional units of land. Any environ-
mental policy requiring the need for additional land
comes at a small cost to farmers who have access to
adequate neighboring land. The result assumes that
the only cost incurred by the hog farmer is in the
transportation of manure to this land, but the actual
costs may be higher since crop producers do not
fully substitute manure nutrients for inorganic
fertilizer (as reported by Kaplan, Johannson, and
Peters, 2004).
The major costs of the environmental policies
examined here arise when no additional lands are
available, since the primary option to reducing
nutrient residuals is to cut back manure through a
reduction in hog production. The predicted prices
for the empirical model reflect actual changes in
farmland prices for the most livestock-intensive
regions of southwestern Ontario that have faced a
local stocking density standard. Imposing this stand-
ard for all producers will increase the demand for
farmland, with the extent of the increase dependent
on the size of livestock production relative to avail-
able cropland. Thus, the implementation of stocking
density restrictions common in current or pending
legislation facing many livestock farmers could
have significant individual and sectoral cost impli-
cations depending on land availability.
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